What follows are my notes on Peter Singer’s “All Animals are Equal”. Each section/response is preceded by the paragraph of the paper it is referring to.
Counterexample to Human Equality
In response paragraph 10:
As Singer rightly points out, humans are indeed not truly equal. It is commonly pointed out that over the whole of the different sexes and races, there are individuals more capable in any one dimension than members of the other categories. This, the thought goes, provides justification for the treatment of these different races and sexes equally as they are, potentially, just as capable as each other. This justification though, as Singer shows, still leaves open a variety of other forms of discrimination like that of intelligence.
Just as we have an intuitive distaste of treating those with different skin colors or genders unequally (brought on by our psychology, evolution, society, etc.), we have a distaste for treating the less intelligent unequally. At least to the point where we deny them equal political power, for instance.
Foundation of Equality
In response to paragraph 13:
I am totally in accordance with Singer that claims of treating others equally cannot be based on some logical reasoning (and how could it? logic has no goals and is merely a vehicle to achieve them) and are instead a “prescription of how we should treat humans.” Whether or not all humans are equal, and in a variety of dimensions they are certainly not, that has no bearing on how we ‘ought’ to treat them. Like any moral judgement, the principle of equality is asserted because it is ‘right’ or ‘good’. Almost like an axiom, this principle is simply accepted and its consequences explored by Singer.
Of course, the choice of this axiom is no more arbitrary than the choice of axioms of ZFC set theory. The reason Singer, and many other philosophers, accept this axiom is because it has an intuitive draw. An intuition cultivated by the evolution of our psychology as well as the evolution of our society and culture.
Evolution of Psychology
While we may think it unlikely for Singer’s ideas to have arisen in anything short of a modern world, with its philosophy and human rights movements, it could be argued that Singer’s ideas first arose in the days of the hunter gatherers. Those who we believed to have practiced animism and had a sort of respect for the animals they killed to survive. They believed their spirts permeated nature itself in one way or another, and performed rituals to show respect to those spirits. A consideration of their equality if you will, brought on by evolution possibly as a way to cope with the perceived brutishness of their actions.
Evolution of Society and Culture
And equally, it is hard to imagine Singer arguing for ‘animal rights’ in a world without the liberation movements of women and black people. Either via them not happening yet or them not being needed at all and everybody always having been considered equal.
Regarding ‘Interests’
In response to paragraph 18:
It seems in stating that “[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests”, Singer has defined ‘interests’. And, depending what definition of suffering Singer intended, the resulting definition of ‘interests’ may run counter to the intuitive notion of interests we may already hold. Does a computer programmed to play chess have an interest in winning? If so, it must also have a capacity for suffering according to Singer. If not, why? Is it something biological in nature that demarcates the capacity to suffer? This runs counter to our notions of computability. Consider a simulation of an animal brain that we classically consider to be able to ‘suffer’ (simulations of which already exist1). Is it unethical to cause this simulation pain? If not, this would seem to imply something immaterial existent in our flesh. A seemingly ridiculous proposition for modern science. What about a virus (or any other organism that isn’t classically able to suffer) that has an ‘interest’ in spreading its genetic matter? It certainly does not have the capacity to suffer by most definitions and so, counter to my intuition at least, doesn’t really have an interest in its own survival according to Singer.
If there is a contradiction between our normal notion of interests and Singer’s, then we can certainly assert that our intuitive notion of ‘interests’ was wrong. However, in doing so we leave ourselves open to the counter “who’s to say your notion of equality and consideration of suffering wasn’t also wrong?” After all, we so arbitrarily accepted the principle of equality and then subsequently threw out interests solely on the basis of intuition. Such an argument would seem more like a textbook defining a mathematical structure and less a philosopher making an argument.
Why Not Save the Animals?
In response to paragraphs 21-26:
While I wholly agree with Singer that our treatment of animals in mass scale killing plants would be counter to his principle of equality, and even our standard intuitions of ethicality, and also agree that for the most part eating meat is a choice based on taste and not on necessity, I don’t see why he stops there.
Just as Singer makes us consider replacing an animal test-subject with a human child, let us consider replacing humans with animals in the following scenario: Consider a cannibal who eats tens of people a week. Should we not stop this cannibal from eating these people? Well certainly, you’d have to be morally bankrupt to allow such behavior, right? Now replace the cannibal with a fox and the tens of people with small mammals and birds (all of which can suffer in both science and Singer’s view). What now? It would seem this principle of equality tells us we should be doing everything we can to stop these foxes from killing these mice unnecessarily.
Now there are some obvious objections to this scenario but lets break them down:
- You’re messing with the natural order: Humans were certainly evolved to hunt, kill, and eat animals. Just look at your canine teeth if you want proof. If you believe that animals shouldn’t be eaten by humans, this objection doesn’t pass the principle of equality test.
- Foxes need meat to survive: Foxes are actually omnivores, and even if they weren’t and couldn’t survive without meat like how humans supposedly can, shouldn’t we still stop the foxes? We are now in a situation where we have a person who will slowly become less healthy over time and to prevent this has to kill tens of innocent people (whose lives and suffering should be considered equally to that of anyone else).
- It’s different for animals, they don’t know better: Consider a mentally impaired individual who kills tens of people. Is he justified in this action despite him not knowing any better or even having the capacity to know better? Moreover, does this matter? Ultimately the question is should we stop him, which the answer is, I assume in most circles, yes.
So, taking Singer’s argument to heart, it would seem that it is our moral duty to prevent animals from killing other animals with the same veracity we do in tracking down serial killers.
So what is Singer Really Doing?
Ultimately Singer hasn’t found some profound new aspect of moral reality or a forgone consequence of the principles of morality we have already established. What he is doing is formalizing (i.e. doing the mental gymnastics required to make peace with) his intuition that killing animals is ‘bad’, or that causing suffering is ‘bad’. These intuitions of his have no basis other than, as I’ve said before, the millennia our psychology has evolved through and the centuries our culture has shaped that psychology since birth.
An Arbitrary Line Between Humans and Animals
In response to paragraph 30:
Singer brings up an important point here. I agree wholly that whenever one tries to consider what features distinguish humans (as being superior or deserving moral consideration) from those of other animals, they can never quite define them in a way that excludes all animals but includes all humans. Is it the ability to use tools? No, apes can do that. How about emotion? Lots of animals display that. Language? Nope. How about Society? Culture? Maybe intelligence? What about those who live outside of society? What about those incapable of partaking in society due to being mentally disabled? There is always an exception to the rule, and this fact proves troublesome to the notion of human equality being anything but arbitrary.
Why Stop at Animals?
In response to paragraph 34-35:
I am in agreement with Singer. Why can’t animals have and enjoy ‘good lives’ or have an ‘intrinsic dignity’ to their soul? What I disagree with is that he doesn’t take this further to computer programs that have served their purpose and can thus terminate successfully. I’m only being partially facetious. The point I’m making is that just as Frankena’s line between humans and animals is arbitrary, so too is Singer’s between animals and say plants or silicon chips.
And even sticking to animals, are all animals persons? At what stage in evolution do we draw the line? Wouldn’t any such line be arbitrary? We certainly couldn’t include the rocks on which abiogenesis took place right?
Conclusion
It would seem that, depending on what groups you wish to include as ‘persons’, the key features that distinguish person from non-person, and arbitrary distinctions that come with them (human vs. animal, biochemical vs. silicon, ‘intelligent’ vs. not, etc.), would have to change to try and encompass that group and only that group. It would also seem that such a set of features is impossible to define save straight up listing what is a person and what is not.
Even worse, trying to remove all arbitrary distinctions would leave you with everything being a person or the lack of personhood at all. It’s for these reasons that I simply don’t buy the notion of personhood at all. It is a just an intuitive concept, borne of the statistical nonsense evolved in our brains to make us more fit. Not some underlying moral truth of the universe (whatever that means). The propensity to believe in such hocus pocus is reflective of our own evolution and socialization. Indeed, it quite useful for humans to think of themselves as ‘persons’ deserving ‘rights’ as opposed to those non-people like plants, animals, or those in the out-group. Moreover it is also a useful adaptation in the internal sense as you can imagine that a caveman who doubts his own self-agency and its existential ramifications might not be an effective hunter.
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Worm brains have been simulated whole (although they aren’t considered to be able to suffer), and so have cat brains, and parts of human brains. Side note to the worm thing, people would be hesitant to cut up a live worm the same way they do a plant yet, they should be no morally different considering they feel no pain. Just more fuel to the fire of inconsistent intuition that is morality. Another side note, these simulated brains run much slower than real life ones. It wouldn’t logically make any moral difference, yet we may still feel like it does, highlighting yet again the arbitrariness of our notion of morality. ↩